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Abstract 
 
Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for 
the use of auctions and which have not been studied previously.  This paper reports on 
laboratory experiments testing three auction forms – uniform and discriminatory price 
sealed bid auctions and an ascending clock auction.  We test the ability of subjects to 
tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits.  Our main result is that the 
discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock 
auction, both without and with explicit communication.  The clock appears to facilitate 
successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows 
bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and 
quantity).   
 
Introduction 
Environmental policy makers are increasingly using market-based approaches to 
regulation of the environment and natural resources. These approaches, long advocated 
by economists, typically involve the creation of a limited property right for the use of 
some publicly regulated environmental resource. These “permits”1 are transferred to 
individual agents who, in turn, are expected to manage the resources they own so as to 
                                                 
* Acknowledgements.  
1 Tradable emission rights are generally referred to as ‘allowances’.  The experiments reported on here used 
the more context-neutral word ‘permits.’  Consequently, we will refer to them as permits throughout. 
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maximize their economic value. The socially-determined environmental goals are met by 
setting the number of permits to be allocated and by enforcing the condition that any use 
of the environmental resource must be covered by the ownership of the requisite number 
of permits. These approaches, broadly referred to as ‘cap and trade’ programs are 
expected to induce users to select low-cost measures for environmental improvement and 
to efficiently allocate the use of resources. As a result, these approaches have been shown 
to substantially reduce the overall costs of environmental regulation relative to traditional 
command and control approaches to regulation.  
The use of environmental markets has expanded to include such diverse areas as 
the management of fisheries, allocation of hunting licenses, access to eco-tourism, 
management of water resources, and regulation of thermal and nutrient pollution in 
streams.  The most economically important environmental markets have emerged in the 
management of air pollution. A crucial feature in the design of these programs is the 
mechanism by which property rights to environmental assets such as emissions permits 
are distributed initially. The approach used in most previous emissions trading programs 
has been free allocation of permits to shareholders of incumbent emitting facilities, a 
process known as “grandfathering.” This approach has been subject to a broad critique 
based on results from the economics literature showing that there may be very substantial 
efficiency gains from selling permits initially.   Recent policy proposals rely on markets 
to determine the initial distribution of environmental assets.  
The largest environmental market in the world is the European Union (EU) 
market for carbon dioxide (CO2) emission allowances, known as the Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS), which had an annual asset value of approximately $61 billion in 2008. In 
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the first and second trading periods of the ETS (from 2005-2012) regulations required 
that the vast majority of allowances be distributed for free (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007). 
However, ensuing criticisms have led the European Commission to propose a major 
revision that would replace free allocation to the power sector with the use of an auction 
beginning in 2013, and would expand this approach to most other covered emission 
sources by 2020. Proposals for use of an auction have also emerged as an important 
feature of legislative proposals for US climate policy.  
The second mandatory CO2 cap-and-trade policy in the world, and the first to 
require the widespread use of auctions, began in 2009 and includes the 10 northeastern 
states that formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This policy covers 
CO2 emissions from electricity generators within the region. CO2 emissions are capped 
initially at levels comparable to those at the beginning of this decade and then ramped 
down to 10 percent below initial cap levels by 2019. A number of other multi-state 
initiatives to limit carbon emissions are also underway.  These programs have served as 
models for the development of programs at the national level to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
The RGGI proposal represents a substantial break with the past. Rather than give 
the permits (termed “emission allowances” in RGGI) away for free, the RGGI states have 
decided to auction close to 90 percent of their annual CO2 permit budgets. As the first 
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program to start with a substantial revenue-generating 
auction of permits, this initiative will have a global impact that will be felt beyond efforts 
to control climate change. Annual allowance auctions have been held since 1995 under 
the well-known SO2 cap and trade program in the U.S., but no revenue is raised as all 
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proceeds are refunded.  The first known cases of allowance sale to raise revenues are the 
over-the-counter sale of NOx allowances by Kentucky starting in 2004 and the 2004 
auction of NOx allowances by Virginia. (Holt, Shobe, & Smith, 2006) 
A general measure of the efficiency of an auction is its ability to elicit bids that 
reflect actual valuations by bidders and thereby allocate resources to their highest-valued 
use. Bidding true willingness to pay is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for 
allocative efficiency. Collusive bidding drives a wedge between bidders’ actual values for 
the goods being sold and the bids made at auction. Goods may still be allocated to their 
highest valued use, but this would depend on perfect collusion that reduced the bid below 
willingness to pay equally for all bidders.  If successful, collusive bidding also will result 
in goods being sold for prices below the value that bidders place on those resources, 
thereby lowering revenues for the seller. The possibility of this outcome presents 
significant political risk to a government agency selling a good because revenues may be 
considerably below those expected, and the auction will not be viewed as a fair and 
transparent process for selling government assets, in this case, CO2 permits. A collusive 
auction outcome can interfere with the efficiency of existing markets by generating false 
price signals and by increasing price volatility.  These considerations are especially 
important when new classes of environmental assets are being created by governments 
and allocated to final users through market instruments. 
The specific question we address in this paper is whether the type of auction used 
to sell environmental assets will affect the likelihood of collusive behavior by auction 
participants.  In a series of experiments, we investigate the likelihood of collusive 
outcomes for a variety of auction types.  We compare the performance of single round 
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auction formats, both discriminatory (“pay as bid”) and uniform price (all pay the highest 
rejected bid), with the multi-round ascending price English clock auction.  In the single-
round sealed-bid auctions, bidders submit bids that specify prices for blocks of permits, 
so the bids have both price and quantity dimensions.   In the multi-round auctions, 
bidders submit quantities at a given price. If demand exceeds supply, the price is raised 
(analogous to advancing the time on a clock) until there is no excess demand.   
It is difficult to compare the revenue generating and efficiency properties of 
sealed-bid, multi-unit discriminatory and uniform price auctions from a theoretical 
perspective because the strategy spaces are complex and multiple equilibria exist.  There 
is currently no theoretical evidence to support using one auction type over the other as 
there is no clear theoretical ranking between the two in terms of revenue or efficiency 
(Ausubel & Cramton, 1998; Back & Zender, 1993; Bikhchandani & Huang, 1989; 
Binmore & Swierzbinkski, 2000).   
Experimental studies comparing sealed-bid uniform and discriminatory auctions 
suggest that the preferred auction type for revenue generation may depend on market 
characteristics particular to the good being sold.  The first experimental study of 
alternative auction formats is reported by Smith (1967).  In his setup, bidders were 
restricted to bid for two units, which had a known value common to all bidders after the 
auction.  The main finding is that when there is a small amount of excess demand 
(rejected bids), uniform price sealed-bid auctions generate more revenue than 
discriminatory (pay as bid) auctions.  This difference disappears in competitive settings 
when there is large excess demand.  Cox, Smith, & Walker (1985) compare both single 
unit and multi-unit demand for the uniform and discriminatory auction formats.  They 
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find that revenue drops for both auction types when the multi-unit demand is introduced, 
but find no difference in average auction revenues between the two formats.  Miller and 
Plott (1985) consider another dimension, the elasticity of demand.  They find that when 
demand is inelastic, discriminatory auctions generate more revenue than uniform auctions 
and when demand is elastic, uniform auctions are superior to discriminatory auctions. 
Results of Goswami, Noe, & Rebello (1996) suggest that uniform price auctions may 
raise more revenue when only tacit collusion is possible, but when explicit collusion is 
possible discriminatory raises more. 
The early experimental papers were largely focused on comparisons of sealed bid 
auctions that were relevant for Treasury auctions, but multi-round auctions have received 
considerable attention as well.  The theoretical equilibria of the sealed-bid uniform price 
auction and the English clock auction (also a uniform price auction) are indistinguishable 
(Porter & Vragov, 2006).  However, because these auction types yield multiple equilibria 
in a multi-unit context, as bidders attempt to coordinate their actions (tacitly or 
explicitly), different auction designs may result in systematically different outcomes.  For 
example, it has been suggested that the dynamic nature of the English clock auction may 
aid in price discovery, especially in auction environments for new assets where a price 
has not already been established (Cramton, 1998).  In addition, bidders in clock auctions 
interact in multiple rounds, and if attempting to collude they would coordinate their bids 
along only one dimension (quantity), which may make collusion easier than in sealed-bid, 
single round auctions where bids include two dimensions (quantity and price).  
There is, however, emerging theoretical evidence that subtle institutional 
characteristics can cause the performance of one-shot and ascending-price auctions to 
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diverge.  For example, Marshall & Marx (2009) show that the availability of information 
about registrants for an auction can make ascending-bid auctions more susceptible to 
collusion relative to one-shot auctions.  Other important factors are the availability of 
resale opportunities which may facilitate collusion in English auctions (Garratt, Troge, & 
Zheng, 2007), the nature of any repeated commercial interaction between bidders, and the 
homogeneity of goods and bidders (Marshall & Marx, 2009). 
An experimental study by Alsemgeest, Noussair, & Olson (1998) suggests that 
the clock auction may be more susceptible to tacit collusion.  They compare the 
performance of the sealed-bid uniform price auction with the English clock auction in 
environments with both single-unit and two-unit demand for each bidder.  
Communication between bidders is not allowed, but bids and bidder identification 
numbers are made public after each round of the clock auction and at the end of each 
sealed bid auction.  The authors find that the sealed bid auction generates more revenue 
than the clock auction for both single and two unit demand.2  Goeree, Offerman, and 
Sloof (2006) report a multi-unit auction experiment designed to assess the likelihood of 
demand withholding in a very simple environment with no opportunities for 
communication.  In their experiment, groups of 3 participants were competing for 6 
available units.  Each bidder received a randomly determined private value for three 
units, so the total demand at a zero price could be as high as 9.  The experiments were 
either run as discriminatory auctions or as clock auctions in which bidders were informed 
when anyone reduced their bid quantities.  Tacitly coordinated “demand reduction” 
                                                 
2 Computer simulations can also be used to study auction performance under pre-specified behavioral 
assumptions.  For example, Sunnevåg (2003) simulates bidding behavior in ascending price auctions for 
emissions allowances when there is an oligopolistic product market. The simulations compare outcomes 
when firms bid sincerely and strategically, and find the profit-maximizing bidding strategy is sensitive to 
the relative emission intensity of production for the bidders as well as the rules of the auction. 
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tended to stop the clock at low prices, and auction revenues were much higher in the 
discriminatory auction, i.e. 151 versus 40 for the clock, a difference that was statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  In addition, there was less revenue variability across 
auctions in the discriminatory treatment.  The revenue advantage of the discriminatory 
auction even persisted in other asymmetric treatments in which two of the bidders in each 
group were “incumbents” with strong incentives to bid high and exclude the third bidder 
(“entrant”).  This paper did not consider a uniform price sealed bid auction, but the 
authors summarize the literature relevant to this comparison: “Pooling the results from 
these different studies suggests that demand reduction is more pronounced in ascending 
auctions than in uniform-price auctions.” (p. 2) 
In sum, the theoretical ranking of these different auction mechanisms remains 
ambiguous. Markets for environmental assets are relatively new and there is little 
experience with the use of auctions for distributing these assets. Our experimental 
analysis of the relative performance of these auctions with market characteristics similar 
to environmental markets and in particular the new CO2 market provides valuable 
information to regulators.     
We ran our first laboratory sessions with simple, generic, competitive market 
conditions.  For example, cost varied randomly across auctions, emission permits were 
not bankable between auctions, there was no secondary market for trading outside of the 
auction, and there was no opportunity for explicit communication. In this setting the 
auction forms tested generated similar results with little evidence of differences in 
efficiency or revenues across auction types. There are, however, some particular features 
of emissions permit auctions focused on a single emitting sector, the electricity sector, 
 9 
that may be conducive to collusion:  1) These auctions are likely to be conducted on a 
regular basis. The RGGI auctions that begin in September 2008 will be held quarterly, for 
example.  Collusion may be easier with a longer series of auctions.   2) Cost conditions 
are relatively stable at the firm level from one auction to the next, and such stability may 
facilitate collusion.  3) Permits are tradable, so auctions are preceded and followed by 
active spot markets, which let bidders acquire needed permits if collusion fails, e.g. if a 
bidder bids low and is overbid by others.3  Also, to the extent that collusion involves 
equal price bids resulting in some randomness in quantities won at auction, there can be 
inefficiencies in the auction outcome, which can be remedied later in the spot market.  4) 
Permits are bankable, so the risk of getting no permits due to a failed attempt to collude is 
mitigated.  5) Although explicit collusion is illegal, it is possible to hide appeals among 
participants to cut back on bids by expressing these appeals in terms of the need to 
protect the environment and pollute less. (6) Compliance need only be demonstrated 
every third period.  Generators may run a permit deficit in any period that is not a 
compliance period (or a surplus in any period).  This provides additional protection 
against negative consequences of not winning permits in a given auction.  Moreover, 
many of the industry representatives feel some antagonism to new caps on emissions, and 
these representatives meet regularly to discuss the management of the transmission grid 
and the functioning of the electricity spot markets. 
We expected these institutional features could be important, and therefore, we ran 
two more series of laboratory sessions with conditions intended to capture some of these 
special features.  These sessions had a longer series of auctions than our first series, the 
                                                 
3 For example, looking at timber auctions, Haile (2001, 2003) finds that the opportunity for resale has 
important implications for behavior in an auction. 
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cost draws for bidders did not change between auctions, each auction was followed by a 
spot market, permits could be banked, and there were fewer bidders than in the baseline 
setting.  In addition, the last series of laboratory sessions were conducted with “chat 
room” opportunities to communicate and collude explicitly.  We compare the 
performance of single round auction formats, both discriminatory (“pay as bid”) and 
uniform price (all pay the highest rejected bid) in theses settings, with the multi-round 
English clock auction. 
Our main result for these sessions with a rich environment is that the 
discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock action, 
both without and with explicit communication.  The clock appears to be more subject to 
successful collusion because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to 
focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).  
The experimental procedures and results are reported in the next several sections, 
followed by a more detailed discussion of the extent to which the observed data patterns 
are relevant for RGGI and other auction-based emissions control programs. 
 
Procedures 
 Auctions for emissions permits are multi-unit auctions, since the blocks of permits 
being sold in a given auction are identical.  Multi-unit auctions can be distinguished by 
whether or not there are multiple rounds of bidding, and by whether all winning bidders 
pay the same “uniform” price or whether they pay what they bid, which is termed a 
“discriminatory” price rule.  In the experiment, we focused on the three auction formats 
that have received the most attention for emissions policy: discriminatory price sealed 
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bid, uniform price sealed bid, and clock (multi-round, uniform price).  In a discriminatory 
auction, bidders submit sealed bids on blocks of permits, and these are ranked from high 
to low.  The highest bids are declared winners, and those bidders have to pay their own 
bid prices.  In a uniform price auction, sealed bids on blocks are collected and ranked, 
with the cutoff for winning again being determined by the number of blocks being sold.  
The difference is that winning bidders need only pay a common, market-clearing price, 
which in the experiments was the highest rejected bid.  In both formats, a bidder is free to 
bid differing amounts on blocks, subject to a restriction that bids exceed an announced 
reserve price.  In contrast, the multi-unit clock auction begins at the reserve price, and 
bidders are asked to state the number of blocks desired at that price.  If the total demand 
exceeds the amount being auctioned, the clock price is raised by a pre-announced bid 
increment. In the next round bidders can reduce their (quantity) bid or leave it unchanged, 
and this process of increasing prices and re-bidding continues until demand is at or below 
the auction quantity.  In order to force bidders to participate actively in early rounds, 
there is an activity rule that prevents them from increasing their bid quantities from one 
round to the next.  To maintain comparability, bids in the sealed-bid auctions were 
restricted to be at price levels determined by fixed bid increments above the same reserve 
price that was used in the clock auctions. 
 The auctions were evaluated in a stylized setting that was intended to capture key 
aspects of the market for permits, while keeping the setup simple enough to be relatively 
transparent for subjects. The experiments involved a total of 324 subjects who earned an 
average of about $30 for a session lasting about one and a half hours.  Each experimental 
session involved either 6 or 12 participants, recruited from the undergraduate population 
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at the University of Virginia.  Participants were paid $6 for showing up, in addition to 
earnings from purchasing the auctioned “permits” at prices below their values in the 
experiment. Each participant was given the role of a firm with multiple “units” of 
capacity that could be used to produce a product that sold at a known price.  The use of 
each capacity unit required that the person obtain permits. 
To keep the experiment from becoming too complicated, we used relatively small 
numbers of permits; with 60 permits being sold in each auction (or 30 permits in the 
sessions with only 6 bidders).  Thus each permit in the experiment corresponds to a block 
of hundreds or thousands of “emissions permits” in practice.  For example, RGGI 
allowances will be sold in lots of 1,000.  All bidders were given 5 capacity units, but we 
introduced an asymmetric cost of compliance by requiring some subjects to obtain more 
permits to operate capacity than others.  In particular, half of the subjects were “low 
users,” who needed one permit for each capacity unit, and half were “high users” who 
were required to obtain two permits to operate each of their capacity units.  Low users 
provide a simple representation of generators that use natural gas, and the high users 
represent generators that use coal, which produces approximately twice the CO2 
emissions as gas per unit of electricity produced.  The equal numbers of low and high 
users was intended to roughly mimic the relative sizes of coal and gas generators in the 
region.  This asymmetry is also important because coordinating collusive demand 
reductions may be more difficult in the presence of asymmetries that make it harder for 
bidders to agree on how to share the burden of demand reductions.4   
                                                 
4 For example, Mason, Phillips, and Nowell (1992) report that subjects in the asymmetric duopoly games were 
less cooperative than was the case for symmetric Cournot markets. 
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Production costs for each unit were randomly generated in each round, in order to 
ensure that comparisons among auctions were not driven by particular configurations of 
production costs.  The difference between the known price of the product and the 
randomly generated cost is the operating margin before permit costs, and permit values 
are determined by taking this margin and dividing by the required number of permits to 
operate a unit of capacity.  For example, with a production cost of 5 and a price of 12, the 
margin is 7, and the value for a permit would be 7 for a low user who requires one permit 
to operate the capacity unit, whereas the value for each permit would be 3.5 = 7/2 for a 
high user who is required to have two permits to operate.  The production costs for low 
users were set to be roughly twice as high as the costs for high users, to reflect the higher 
costs associated with natural gas generation.  This cost difference also served to 
approximately equalize earnings across subjects with different roles.  The costs for low 
users were randomly drawn from the interval [5, 10], with all values in this interval being 
equally likely, and the costs for high users were drawn from the interval [2, 6]. With a 
fixed output price, the distribution of costs determines a range of permit values.  Since 
costs are drawn from the range [5, 10] for low users, with all draws in this range being 
equally likely, then a product price of 12 will result in a range of permit values between  
2 (= 12-10)  and 7 (= 12-5).  The values for high users are obtained by dividing operating 
margins by the required number of permits (2) per capacity unit, so a cost distribution 
from the range [2, 6] results in values between 3 (= (12 – 6)/2) and 5 (= (12 – 2)/2).   
Using these basic value distributions and bidder types, we ran three series of 
experiments, with setup parameters shown in Table 1.  The baseline series used a simple, 
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more competitive setup with 12 bidders, with no explicit communication and costs were 
re-randomized for each round within a session, and with no banking or spot markets.  
 
Table 1. Combinations of Settings and Auction Mechanisms Considered 
Baseline Setting Richer Setting Richer Setting 
No Communication No Communication Communication 
12 bidders 6 bidders 6 bidders 
60 permits 30 permits 30 permits 
re-randomize costs same costs same costs 
no banking or spot banking and spot banking and spot 
8 auctions per session 12 auctions per session 12 auctions per session 
Uniform (3 sessions) 
Discriminatory (3 sessions) 
Clock (3 sessions) 
Uniform (6 sessions) 
Discriminatory (6 sessions) 
Clock (6 sessions) 
Uniform (6 sessions) 
Discriminatory (6 sessions) 
Clock (6 sessions) 
 
 The two rich environment series were focused on the three auction formats that 
have been used (in some form or another) in previous emissions permit auctions (Burtraw 
& Palmer, 2006).  In the second setting, shown in the center column of the table, we cut 
the numbers of bidders and permits in half, to increase the opportunities for tacit 
collusion, although explicit collusion was not permitted in this second setting.  These 
sessions used the same uniform distributions of random cost draws as in the baseline, but 
there was only a single set of cost draws done at the start of each session, so a given 
bidder’s costs for capacity units remained the same in all auctions.  The possibility of 
tacit collusion was further enhanced by running more auctions, 12, in each session, and 
having a spot market that followed each auction, to let bidders acquire needed permits 
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that were not obtained in the auction.  We ran six sessions for each of the auctions 
formats: uniform sealed bid, discriminatory sealed bid, and English clock.  The random 
draws were balanced in the sense that we used the same sequence of random number 
“seed” values for each auction format, so the random cost draws for the first clock 
session match the random draws for the first uniform price and discriminatory sessions.  
A new set of random draws was used for the second session in each format, etc.    
The third setting, shown in the right column of Table 1, used the same 6 sets of 
random number draws and was the same as the second in other dimensions, except that 
explicit communications were permitted.  This was done by letting bidders communicate 
in an electronic chat room for 2 minutes prior to each of the sealed bid auctions 
(discriminatory and uniform). Bidders were allowed to communicate for 1 minute prior to 
the first round of each clock auction and for an additional 15 seconds prior to each 
subsequent round of bidding in the clock auctions. The clock auctions generally only 
lasted for a few rounds, so the total time available for chat was roughly comparable.  An 
alternative would have been to have no chat between rounds in a clock auction, but this 
would ignore the fact that if explicit collusion occurs, it may continue during a clock 
auction.  
The spot markets, that followed the auctions in the second and third series, were 
structured so that participants could submit limit orders that specify a maximum quantity 
of permits and a maximum purchase price or a minimum sales price, e.g. sell up to 6 
permits for at least $4.  Buy orders were arrayed from high to low, sell orders were 
arrayed from low to high, and the price determined by the intersection of these arrays was 
the price at which transactions were executed.  Then after the spot market cleared, 
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subjects decided how many permits to use in production, and whether to bank permits or 
incur a deficit.  It was announced that any deficit in permits was penalized at a rate of $9 
(about three times the Walrasian auction price prediction) after the spot market that 
followed auctions 3, 6, 9, etc.5 
 
Performance Measures 
The economic problem posed by an emissions cap is to achieve the reduction with 
minimum cost, i.e. by maximizing the economic value associated with the limited supply 
of permits.  For a firm, the value is represented by the difference between the product 
price and the production cost of the added output generated with an additional permit.  
The actual cost draws for each auction were used to calculate the maximum possible 
surplus that can be achieved with the 60 permits available.  This maximum possible 
surplus can be represented by arraying the permit values from high to low as a demand 
function, drawing a vertical line at the fixed supply, and adding up the total area under 
the demand curve to the left of this line, indicated by the sum of the two shaded areas in 
the graph in Figure 1 for a hypothetical set of permit demands.  In an actual auction, the 
permits may not all go to bidders with the highest values, and the actual efficiency is then 
calculated to be the actual value achieved as a percentage of the maximum possible 
value.  In sessions with spot markets, the efficiency calculations are based on the permits 
actually used, after any spot market transactions following each auction.   
 
                                                 
5 In only 5 out of a total of 144 compliance periods included in all of our experiments in the richer setting, 
did a participant end up having to pay the noncompliance penalty. 
 17 
 
Figure 1. Walrasian Equilibrium and Revenue from the Auction 
A second measure of auction performance is based on sales revenues, which is 
important since tacit or explicit collusion may result in low bids and revenues.  If all 
bidders were to bid full value for each permit in a “pay as bid” auction, then the revenue 
would equal the area under the demand curve to the left of the vertical supply, again 
indicated by the sum of the two shaded areas in Figure 1.  This area represents the 
maximum possible surplus that could be captured by the seller.  A more reasonable 
benchmark is the revenue that would be generated if permits sell for the “Walrasian” or 
market-clearing price determined by the intersection of demand and supply.  This 
Walrasian price is calculated numerically, based on the highest rejected bid value and the 
associated amount of revenue is indicated by the shaded rectangle in Figure 1.  Note that 
the Walrasian revenue will be less than 100% of the maximum revenue and how much 
less depends on the steepness of the demand curve to the left of the market clearing price.  
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We analyze efficiency and revenue separately because they are distinct measures of 
auction performance, and an auction that yields high levels of efficiency may or may not 
yield revenues that would be expected in a competitive market. 
 
 Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Baseline Setting     
Efficiency (proportion of maximum surplus) .975 .018 .928 1.00 
Revenue (experimental $) 204 14.9 165 246 
Average Price (experimental $) 3.40 2.48 2.75 4.10 
Richer Setting With No Chat     
Efficiency (proportion of maximum surplus) .959 .039 .641 1.00 
Revenue (experimental $) 90.4 15.4 42.0 128 
Average Price (experimental $) 3.03 .493 2.00 4.25 
Richer Setting With Chat     
Efficiency (proportion of maximum surplus) .949 .038 .655 1.00 
Revenue (experimental $) 77.5 15.2 40.0 128 
Average Price (experimental $) 2.61 .475 2.00 4.27 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the performance measures for each of the three settings.  
These statistics indicate that the richer setting with no communication results in lower 
revenues than the baseline setting.  To see this, note that the size of the market and thus 
the maximum surplus/revenue in the richer setting was half that of the baseline setting, 
but it can be seen that lower prices lead to lower relative revenue generation as well.  In 
addition, the mean efficiencies are 2-3% lower in the richer settings than in the baseline 
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settings.  In the auctions with communication, the mean of the average price is lower than 
for auctions in the richer setting with no communication.    
In the section that follows, we consider results the three treatment categories in 
sequence: baseline, rich environment with no communication, and rich environment with 
communication.  In each case, we will present two sets of statistical tests: 1) 
nonparametric Wilcoxon tests using a single data point for each session, constructed as 
the average revenue for the last half of the auctions in that session, and 2) panel data 
regressions using a random effects specification to incorporate the fact that auction 
outcomes for the same session are not statistically independent.  In order to construct 
Wald tests for separate treatment effects, we ran a single regression that incorporated 
baseline, rich no-chat, and rich chat auctions, which included dummy variables for all 
treatments and interactions, with the clock dummy variable omitted.  The structure and 
coefficient estimates for this regression is presented in Appendix A, and all Wald tests 
supporting empirical conclusions are derived from testing restrictions on those 
coefficients. 
 
Results     
Baseline Setting 
 The left panel of Figure 2 shows the average revenue percentage for the final 4 
auctions, where each bar corresponds to a particular session.  There are 3 sessions for 
each of the auction formats.  Notice that revenue percentages are generally close to the 
Walrasian prediction of 79 percent, illustrated by the darker line.  The revenues in the 
clock auction appear to be slightly lower than the revenues in the other two auction types, 
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however we fail to reject the null hypotheses of equality between the uniform and clock 
coefficients (Wald χ2 = 1.74, p=.1875) and the discriminatory and clock coefficients 
(Wald χ2 = 1.12, p=.2898).    The efficiency percentages for the final 4 auctions in each  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Average Revenues and Efficiencies by Auction Type for Baseline Setting 
(averages over 4 auctions in each session) 
 
 
session are shown on the right side of figure 2, and we see no clear differences among 
auction formats, with all efficiencies being close to 100 percent.6  These tests are the 
basis for our first conclusion: 
 
Result 1 - Baseline Performance:  There are no significant differences between auction 
formats in the competitive baseline environment, either in terms of revenue or efficiency.  
Revenues are near Walrasian predictions, and efficiencies are close to 100%. 
                                                 
6 In addition to the sets of 3 sessions shown reported here, we also ran a second set of sessions in which 
cost draws were made from a narrower range, which yielded a narrower range of permit values.  The results 
of this “elastic demand” treatment are reported in Holt, Shobe, Burtraw, Palmer, & Goeree (2007).  This 
treatment also failed to reveal any clear performance differences between auction formats in terms of 
revenue and efficiency.   
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These results differ slightly from those of Anderson and Holland (2006) who analyze 
auctions for fishing rights in New Zealand.  They also find the discriminatory and 
uniform auction formats to be equally efficient, but they find the discriminatory auction 
to yield higher revenue than the uniform auction.   
 
Richer Setting with No Communication 
Recall that averages of revenue percentages were sharply lower in the rich 
environment with no chat than in the baseline setting.  This effect is captured in the panel 
regression (GLS, AR(1), random effects) shown in (1), which uses revenues for all 
auctions in the baseline and rich (no-chat) sessions.  The dependent variable, Rev, has 
been normalized by dividing the auction revenue by 2 for the 12-person baseline sessions 
to make them comparable to the 6-person session in the rich environment with longer 
series of auctions, spot markets, banking, and compliance penalties.  The dummy 
variables, Uniform, Disc, and Rich  take values of 1 for uniform price, discriminatory and 
rich settings, and Walrasian_Rev is the normalized Walrasian revenue prediction for the 
random draws for that auction.  The omitted treatment dummy is for the clock auction. 
 
(1)  Rev   =   48.93***   +   17.73*** Uniform   +   11.10 Disc   –   13.54***Rich  +  400*  Walrasian_Rev 
                 (24.01)             (4.65)                             (4.65)                (4.06)                 (220) 
 
The significant negative coefficient on Rich indicates that revenues are lower in this 
environment, which is indicative of tacit collusion in the rich environment.  The 
magnitude of this coefficient, $13.54, is economically significant in relation to levels of 
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$70-$80 that were typically observed in 6-person auctions.  The significant and positive 
coefficient on Uniform in (1) indicates that the uniform price auctions raise more revenue 
than clock auctions (the omitted dummy), but this result masks the fact that auction 
format results vary by treatment.  More precise results can be obtained from Wald tests 
on coefficient restrictions for the panel data regression in Appendix A that has all 
interaction terms included.  The results can be summarized: 
 
Result 2 - No-Chat Rich Environment: Revenue generation is significantly lower in the 
rich environment than in the baseline series.  In the no-chat environment, the revenues 
from uniform and discriminatory auction formats cannot be ranked, but both of these 
raise significantly more revenue than the clock auction.   
 
Support:  We find that overall the richer setting with no communication generates less 
revenue than the baseline setting (Wald χ2 = 12.69, p=.0054).  A within auction format 
comparison shows that both the discriminatory and clock auctions raise more revenue in 
the baseline setting than in the richer setting with no communication (Wald χ2 =4.38, 
p=.0364; χ2 =7.07, p=.0078), and we find no difference in revenue generation between 
the two settings in uniform auctions (Wald χ2 =1.27, p=.2603).  Table 3 below displays 
the results of between auction format comparisons in the richer setting with no 
communication.  We also report two-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum tests (sample size of 6), 
using revenue percentages averaged over the last six auctions (with each session 
producing a single data point).  The Wilcoxon and Wald tests yield similar results with 
one exception: the Wald test indicates higher revenues for the discriminatory auction than 
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for the clock auction, although this result is not apparent from the less sensitive Wilcoxon 
test based on a single average revenue for each session.   
 
Table 3: Pair-Wise Revenue Comparisons for Last Six Auctions: Richer 
Setting With No Communication 
(p-values are reported in parentheses, where *** and ** indicate 
significance at the 0.01 and .05 levels respectively) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139 degrees of freedom 
 
 
Richer Setting with Communication 
  
 
Figure 3 shows a comparison of revenues and efficiencies for the rich 
environment sessions with no chat (light gray) and with chat (dark gray).  In each case, 
the order of the bars from left to right corresponds to the random number seed.  Revenues 
are generally well below the Walrasian predictions, both with and without chat, which is 
a clear difference from the baseline results shown in Figure 1. In contrast, the efficiency 
remains close to that in the baseline.7 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The efficiency results reported in Figure 3 are with respect to the distribution of permits after the 
secondary market clears.  We have also looked at the efficiency results prior to trading on the secondary 
market and we find that all auctions are close to 100% efficient with no meaningful differences across the 
different auction types. 
 
Findings Wald chi^2 Wilcoxon  Rank Sum 
Uniform no chat > 
Clock no chat 
14.50*** 
(0.000) 
25** 
(0.026) 
Discriminatory no chat> 
Clock no chat 
4.97** 
(0.026) 
32 
(0.310) 
Uniform no chat ~ 
Discriminatory no chat  
2.49 
(0.115) 
33 
(0.3939) 
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Figure 3: Revenues and Efficiencies for Last Six Auctions by Auction Type:  
No Communication Versus Communication 
 
Figure 4 shows average purchase prices for permits under the two settings with no 
communication in the left panel and with communication in the right panel.  The effect of 
communication is to lower auction prices for all auction mechanisms.  In addition the 
prices for the clock auction are lower both without and with communication. Notice that 
the average price for the discriminatory price auction converged to the average price for 
the uniform price auction in a few rounds.  For reference, the average Walrasian 
prediction (where supply equals demand), averaged over all 6 sessions, is shown as a 
thick dashed horizontal line just above $3.50. 
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Figure 4: Average Price by Auction 
 
As before, we begin with a simple panel data regression (GLS, AR(1), random 
effects) that only includes data from auctions in the two rich environment treatments, 
with the clock dummy omitted.  The significant positive coefficients on Uniform and 
Disc indicate that these auction formats yield higher revenues than the clock auction in 
this rich environment.  The negative coefficient estimate for Chat is indicative of the 
effectiveness, on average, of explicit collusion.  All of these coefficients are 
economically significant relative to the typical revenue levels of $70-$80 with no chat 
and $60-$80 with chat.     
 
(2)  Rev   =   44.85*   +   19.29*** Uniform   +   15.52*** Disc   –   13.85***Chat  +  294  Walrasian_Rev 
                 (26.66)         (4.28)                             (4.28)                      (3.49)                 (243) 
 
 
Specific comparisons among auction formats are derived from two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests using average revenues by session (last half of the auctions) and from Wald 
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tests (for the panel data regression in the appendix with dummies and interactions).   The 
results of these tests can be summarized: 
 
Result 3 - Explicit Collusion: Revenues were significantly lower in the clock auction 
with chat than in either the uniform or discriminatory auctions with chat, and  2) The 
effect of chat was to reduce revenues in both the uniform and clock auctions. 
 
Support:  The relevant tests are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Pair-Wise Revenue Comparisons for Last Six Auctions: 
(p-values are reported in parentheses, where *** and ** indicate significance at the 
0.01 and .05 levels respectively) 
 
Findings Wald chi^2 Wilcoxon  Rank Sum 
Chat   
Uniform chat >  
Clock chat 
9.72*** 
(0.002) 
27 
(0.056) 
Discriminatory chat >  
Clock chat 
11.15*** 
(0.001) 
23*** 
(0.009) 
Uniform chat ~ 
 Discriminatory chat 
.05 
(.8251) 
38 
(0.900) 
Chat vs. No Chat    
Clock no chat >  
Clock chat 
6.92*** 
(0.009) 
28 
(0.093) 
Uniform no chat >  
Uniform chat 
11.02*** 
(0.001) 
25** 
(0.024) 
Discriminatory no chat ~ 
Discriminatory chat 
2.32 
(.1281) 
31 
(0.243) 
 211 degrees of freedom 
The averages shown in Figure 4 do not adequately emphasize the striking 
tendency for clock auctions with collusion to stop at the reserve price or at one or two bid 
increments above the reserve, as shown as a histogram in Figure 5.  Thirty-eight percent 
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of the 72 clock auctions stop at the reserve price of $2.00 and the average price is $2.29, 
whereas the average prices for the uniform and discriminatory auctions are $2.77 and 
$2.83 respectively.8, 9 
Figure 5: Price Distributions with Communication   
 
The recorded chat between subjects provides some insight into why collusion is 
more successful in clock auctions.  Most of the initial proposals made by participants 
were based on suggesting quantity reductions for low and high users.  The focus on 
quantity reduction in the clock auction sessions is revealed in some of the participants’ 
comments:  “again, bid for fewer permits earlier on so we can get permits cheaper” and 
“this will go 5X faster and will all make LOTS more money if everyone just cooperates 
the first time.”  One person suggested “so why doesn’t everyone bid exactly the same 
                                                 
8 Average prices for each discriminatory auction were rounded to the nearest bid increment. 
9 These results are consistent with Haile (2000), who finds in a theoretical context a partial pooling of bids 
around a reserve price in auctions with a secondary market. 
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amount that we ended last round [auction] with, since we keep getting the same clearing 
price.”  This plan permitted participants to obtain the same final allocation without the 
run up in prices that occurred previously.  Of course, quantity discussions occurred with 
the other auction formats too, but the effect of the clock is to take out the price dimension 
so that bidders only have to reach an agreement in a single dimension, quantity.  
   
 
Figure 6.  Collusion: Low Clock Auction Prices and High Spot Prices  
 
One interesting feature of the data for the clock sessions with chat is that, while auction 
prices were typically near the reserve price, the subsequent trading in the spot market 
tended to be at much higher price levels that were closer to the Walrasian price, as 
indicated in Figure 6.  The auction settings where the spot price is higher than the auction 
price are the clock with both chat and no chat and the uniform with chat, as shown in 
Table 5. Interestingly, these are the three auction settings that we found to be statistically 
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significantly lower revenue than other auction types.  The bidders in these settings were 
manipulating the auction outcomes with successful collusion.  While this would typically 
result in inefficient allocations, these were, to some extent, corrected by trading in the 
spot markets. 
 
Table 5: Spot vs. Auction Prices Averaged Across All Auctions  
(Average Walrasian Price = $3.60) 
Auction Setting Auction Price ($) Spot Market Price ($) 
Uniform No Communication 3.21 3.20 
Discriminatory No Communication 3.11 3.07 
Clock No Communication 2.75 3.01 
Uniform Communication 2.66 2.86 
Discriminatory Communication 2.86 2.74 
Clock Communication 2.31 2.96 
 
There are several widely cited cases in which coordinated demand reductions are 
used to defeat ascending price auctions for broadcast spectrum.  Just prior to the 2001 
Austrian third generation mobile telecommunication spectrum auction, Telekom Austria 
announced that it “… would be satisfied with just two out of the 12 blocks for offer and if 
the [five] other bidders behaved similarly, it should be possible to get the frequencies on 
sensible terms … but that it would bid on a third block if one of its rivals did …”  The 
other bidders clearly understood and the bidding stopped after a couple of rounds, with 
each bidder obtaining 2 blocks (Klemperer, 2004, p. 136).  The extreme symmetry of this 
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situation differs from the bidding environment faced by bidders in RGGI auctions, but the 
success of collusion triggered by a public announcement is disturbing.  
One issue in the implementation of an English clock auction is whether to 
announce the excess demand, that is, the amount by which the bid quantities exceed the 
number of units for sale at each round.  It has been suggested that releasing this 
information can enhance the price discovery function of the English clock auction.  The 
clock auction experiments reported here did not provide excess demand information to 
auction participants.  On average, the clock auction prices observed with collusion were 
quite close to the reserve levels, and therefore we did not think it worthwhile to redo 
these sessions with the additional information that would likely facilitate collusive 
behavior.  With ex post quantity information after each round, bidders would be able to 
“signal” an intent to cooperate by reducing their demands to stop the clock early in one 
auction, in the hopes of inducing reciprocal cooperation from others in subsequent 
auctions.   
In fact, experience from the Virginia NOx auction conducted in 2004 suggests 
that end-of-round quantity information may even induce bidders acting individually to 
reduce quantities bid in order to stop a clock auction.  In the NOx auction, bidders were 
not provided with end-of-round quantity information.  Late in the Virginia NOx auction, 
there was one bidder with a large share of the allowance requests; this bidder could have 
ended the auction by unilaterally reducing demand by a relatively small increment.  As 
the clock price increased, this bidder apparently began shading requests by relatively 
small amounts, in an apparent attempt to “feel around” for the edge needed to stop the 
auction.  We believe that this bidder would have ended the auction sooner, with a quite 
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modest “demand reduction,” if the needed information about demand “overhang” had 
been available (Porter, Rassenti, Shobe, Smith, & Winn, 2009).  
One possible justification for the release of excess demand information in a clock 
auction could be that it may help “price discovery.”  We have recently finished 
conducting a series of sessions, where, after several auctions with stationary conditions, 
there is an unanticipated demand shift that raised permit values for some bidders and not 
for others.  We had expected that releasing excess demand information in a clock auction 
would help bidders discover and react to the change during the first auction following the 
demand shift, but the two flavors of clock, with and without excess demand information, 
tracked the shift up in the Walrasian price equally well, and neither did noticeably better 
then a simple sealed-bid uniform-price auction (Holt et al., 2007).  
 
Conclusion 
The increasing use of market instruments in managing environmental assets has 
lead, in turn, to increased attention to how these new environmental assets should be 
allocated.  A large body of economic literature argues for charging for environmental 
assets rather than granting them for free, the usual practice until quite recently.  The 
recent sales of NOx allowances and of EU CO2 allowances represented a significant 
break from past practice, but proposals to auction allowances in the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, in the EU ETS, and in many of the cap and trade proposals before 
Congress point to a strong trend in favor of the auction of environmental assets.  The 
experiments reported in this paper investigate how opportunities for collusion affect the 
choice of auction type in the allocation of environmental assets.  One of the key 
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innovations in this study is the institutional setting, which includes key features of 
markets for CO2 allowances including permit banking, the presence of secondary 
markets, and compliance periods spanning multiple market periods.  The addition of 
these institutional elements results in significant changes in the likelihood of collusive 
outcomes across auction types. 
In laboratory auctions with communication among participants, collusion is more 
effective in clock auctions than in discriminatory and uniform price auctions.  An 
analysis of the ‘chat’ (instant message communications suggests that clock auctions may 
facilitate collusion by allowing bidders to focus on a single dimension (quantity 
reductions).  The effects of this collusion are reflected in clock prices at or near reserve 
price levels, with subsequent trading at much higher prices in the spot markets. 
This research also supports two key points made in the literature on auctions of 
public resources.  First, auction design must be responsive to the institutional context.  
Because each context will imply different information and different strategies available to 
participants, results for different auction forms may differ dramatically as between 
different institutional settings (Binmore & Klemperer, 2002).  Second, in general, 
increasing the competitiveness of an auction will be associated with better auction 
outcomes (Whitford, 2007).  The design of the institutional setting for the auction of 
environmental assets should emphasize features that increase competition among bidders.  
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Appendix A. Panel Data Regression for all Treatments 
 
In order to assess the effect of the different auction formats on revenue generation 
in these settings, we estimated a panel regression model, restricting the data to auctions in 
the last half of each session (4 auctions for the baseline setting and 6 auctions in the 
richer environment).  Because there were twice as many participants in the baseline 
environment than in the richer settings, we normalized the revenues and Walrasian 
revenues in the baseline auctions by dividing the values by two.  We explain revenue 
generation as a function of normalized Walrasian revenue and treatment indicator 
variables: 
 
(3)    Revit  =  β0 + β1Uniformi + β2 Disci + β3 Richi + β4 Uniformi Richi + β5 Disci Richi  
+ β6 Chati + β7 Uniformi Chati + β8 Disci Chati  +  β9 Walrasian_Revi + εit 
    
In equation (3) above, Revit is the normalized revenue captured by the auctioneer 
in session i and auction t, and Walrasian_revit is the normalized revenue that would be 
captured if all units sold for the competitive Walrasian price.  The constant term, , 
represents the average revenue for the omitted auction (clock, baseline). Uniformi and 
Disci take on the value of 1 when the session used the sealed-bid uniform price or 
discriminatory auction format respectively.  The Richi variable indicates auctions in the 
richer setting and the Chati variable indicates sessions with explicit communication 
opportunities.  We estimate the model using a GLS panel regression where the error term, 
εit, is assumed to have an AR1 correlated structure with an unobserved, random effects 
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component.  The results of the estimation of equation (3) are displayed in Table 6 below.  
The coefficients on the treatment dummies are interpreted as the incremental amount of 
revenue raised, on average, relative to the omitted auction (in this case clock in the 
baseline environment).10     
Table 6. Revenue Capture for All Treatments:  
AR(1) panel GLS with Random Effects 
Constant 
[phase 1 clock no chat] 
56.08*** 
(19.81) 
Uniform 
 
10.58 
(8.030) 
Discriminatory 
 
8.491 
(8.022) 
Rich 
 
-18.38*** 
(6.913) 
Uniform*Rich 10.61 (9.770) 
Discriminatory*Rich 3.921 (9.764) 
Chat -14.64*** (5.66) 
Uniform*Chat -3.837 (7.871) 
Discriminatory*Chat 6.174 (7.871) 
Normalized Walrasian Revenue 3.63** (.178) 
 242 degrees of freedom 
 
                                                 
10 For example, a clock auction with chat in the rich environment raises on average β3 + β6 more/fewer 
experimental dollars than the baseline clock auction.  Likewise, a uniform price auction with chat raises on 
average β1 + β4 + β7  more/fewer experimental dollars than a clock auction with chat.     
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 A more complete assessment of the effects of different combinations of settings and 
auction types requires an assessment of the effects of restrictions on combinations of the 
estimated coefficients.  We use a Wald statistic to test hypotheses whether the 
unrestricted estimates of the coefficients violate restrictions on the coefficients by a 
significant amount.11   
                                                 
11 We tested linear hypotheses in the form Rb = r where b is the estimated coefficient vector.  If V is the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix, the Wald statistic is W = (Rb-r)’(RVR’)-1(Rb-r) which has a chi 
squared distribution and degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.  For example, to test if 
uniform chat revenues are different than clock chat revenues we use the Wald test to see if the sum of the 
coefficients on the uniform and uniform chat dummies is different from zero.     
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